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. . . In a perfect democracy, free from bosses, 
string-pulling and finagling at the polls, Harry Truman 
would probably never have reached Washington. He was 
Tom Pendergast1 s hand-picked candidate, yanked out of 
obscurity so deep few Missouri voters had ever heard of 
him. 
No one yet knows exactly why Boss Pendergast 
picked Truman for the Senate. One theory: The Boss was 
in the whimsical mood of a socialite, sneaking a pet 
Pekingese into the Social Register. A better theory: The 
Boss was impressed by the Midwestern adage that every 
manure pile should sprout one rose — he saw in Truman 
a personally honest, courageous man whose respectability 
would disguise the odors of the Pendergast mob. Certainly 
Truman was no statesman in 1934. Neither had he ever 
been touched by scandal. 
By 1934 considerable scandal had touched Pendergast and morewas to 
come. As Pendergast approached the senatorial election in that year, he 
knew without doubt that he needed a strong candidate to win. The facts spoke 
for themselves. First of all, Pendergast's senatorial candidate in 1932, 
Charles Howell, had been defeated by Bennett Clark who had piled up a mar-
gin of 100,000 votes over Pendergast. Clark's victory showed that the Kan-
sas City vote could be neutralized easily by the St. Louis and/or rural vote. 
St. Louis politician, L. J. Gualdoni, supported Clark but went with Truman 
in 1934. Gualdoni emphasized the ease of swinging back and forth to be with 
a winner.2 To win state-wide elections, Pendergast had to have candidates 
with strong outstate support. Secondly, the litany of crime and voting i r reg-
ularities emanating from Kansas City seemed so endless and of such enlarg-
ing proportion that state and national dissatisfaction intensified acutely in 
1934. Many Missourians still remember some of the following events: 
1. The Union Station Massacre in Kansas City in June, 1933, wherein 
four police officers were killed, and also Frank Nash whom the 
mobsters were trying to free. (Pretty Boy Floyd was one of the 
attackers in this incident. ) 
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2. The Kansas City spring election killings in March, 1934, wherein 
four people were killed and eleven seriously wounded. 
3. The shooting of John Lazia in July, 1934. Lazia had become Pen-
dergast's chief lieutenant on Kansas City's North Side. Henry 
Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, called him the Al Capone 
of Kansas City. He was machine gunned entering his apartment 
building one warm July evening. He died with these words on his 
lips: "Tell Tom Pendergast that I love him." He was killed by the 
same submachine gun used in the Union Station Massacre. There 
are rumors that a few weeks before his death Lazia had drawn a 
knife on Pendergast, and consequently Pendergast had him elimi-
nated. 
4. A running gun battle across the state of Missouri and finally end-
ing in an Ohio corn field where law officers shot and killed Pretty 
Boy Floyd. 
5. Raymond Moley's nationwide statement denouncing the Kansas City 
Police Department as the most corrupt in the nation. 
6. John Dillinger's death in Chicago. 
7. BrunoHauptmann's trial for the Lindbergh kidnapping which occu-
pied the front pages throughout the campaign. 
Even though the last two events had no connection with Pendergast, 
they kept public attention focused on the prevalence of crime. Neverthe-
less, Pendergast seemed at the apex of his power in 1934 with complete 
control in Kansas City and Guy B. Park in the governor's mansion. But it 
was only a semblance of invincibility. An astute observer could see that 
Pendergast's power outside of Kansas City had limitations, and Pendergast 
was the most astute of political observers. The fact that Pendergast's out-
state power was unstable can be seen in several ways. Firs t of all, the 1932 
at-large election was an oddity that redounded to Pendergast's benefit, but 
not in a permanent way. Franklin Mitchell has even questioned the extent of 
Pendergast's influence in the short run. Mitchell admitted that in some of 
the congressional races Pendergast's support was crucial, but in others it 
was either ineffective or inconsequential. John D. Taylor of Keyesville, a 
close friend of Pendergast, received Kansas City's full support and lost. 
Two incumbents, Milton A. Romjue and Clyde Williams, won without the 
machine's help because of their strong rural support.3 Secondly, it was 
also fortuitous that Pendergast was able to place Guy B. Park in the gover-
nor 's mansion. Francis Wilson had won the Democratic primary, but then 
died unexpectedly. Even though Pendergast had picked Wilson to run, many 
observers are of the firm opinion that Wilson would have been much more 
independent of Pendergast than Park proved to be . 4 It is also highly doubt-
ful if Pendergast could have won with Park from the very beginning. Wilson 
won the primary because of his own personal strength and appeal in the 
rural areas and St. Louis, in addition to having Kansas City. If a Pender-
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gast candidate did not have strength in the rural areas and/or St. Louis, his 
chances were precarious. One student of Missouri politics in this era 
expressed it this way: nPendergast could not dictate the nomination of a 
candidate unless the person made a striking appeal to rural voters. In real-
ity then, Pendergast did not possess dictatorial powers, but balance of 
power."5 
The weight of these difficulties became apparent as Pendergast sought 
a good candidate for the Senate in 1934. Joseph Shannon has said that Pen-
dergast most wanted Jim Reed. This is doubtful since Reed was 72 by then 
and speaking out so vehemently against FDR and the New Deal that he would 
have been too much of a liability. Probably the strongest and most desir-
able candidate to Pendergast was James Aylward who had been Pendergast1 s 
right hand man since 1925. Aylward declined to run and I suggest that his 
reason was primarily not wanting to undergo the personal abuse that would be 
directed against a Pendergast candidate, especially outside of Kansas City. 
Aylward never ran for public office, and the reason could easily be the one 
stated. He seemed to always consider running, hesitate and then decline. 
Some have suggested that he was not only sensitive about being a Pendergast 
man, but also about running as a Catholic in the outstate areas. Some peo-
ple have also said that Aylward had regrets in later years for not entering 
the 1934 race. 6 
Another strong possibility, Joseph Shannon, turned down Pendergast's 
request to run. Shannon was safe in his congressional district in the Kansas 
City area. I contend that he was reluctant to undergo the abuse directed 
against a Pendergast candidate in the outstate areas and St. Louis. To the 
objection that Shannon had run before as a Pendergast candidate, I would r e -
ply that he had never run outside of Kansas City, and it was one thing to run 
in Kansas City as a Pendergast man, and another thing to run outstate. (In 
this connection, Professor Dorsett has wondered why the "sagacious Lloyd 
Stark" would be so determined toobtainPendergastTs support in 1936 if such 
support entailed liability. First of all, I would suggest that Stark was not 
from Kansas City and would not be identified as a Pendergast man to the 
extent that Aylward or Shannon would have been. Also, before Stark asked 
for Pendergast's support, it was most clear that he had strong outstate sup-
port in many areas that would keep the Pendergast reaction to a minimum. ) 
That Pendergast realized his limitations is evident by the way in which 
he rejected the attempts of lesser men to get his backing for the 1934 sena-
torial candidacy, particularly Ralph Lozier and Roy McKittrick. Pender-
gast remembered only too well his lesson from 1932 and Howell. 
In the end, Pendergast turned to Harry S. Truman. Truman hesitated 
because of the abusive and slanderous campaign sure to come, but finally 
acceded to run. Although some have said that ". . . h e was yanked from 
obscurity so deep that few Missouri voters had ever heard of him . . . " the 
evidence does not support this contention. Truman had many assets and the 
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type of reputation as a public official necessary to counteract some of the 
nefariousness of Kansas City. 
Although Truman's opponents spoke of him as being obscure and lack-
ing political experience above the county level, and although Truman's oppo-
nents had held jobs that outranked any of Truman's positions, perhaps Tru-
man's political experience was of such a nature as to give him"grass roots" 
support. He had been president of the Missouri County Judge Association; 
consequently, he had maintained close contact with the 342 county judges 
throughout the state. The "courthouse gangs" helped spread the Truman 
name and accomplishments to the far corners of the state. Because the 
county judges often held important posts in the party's organization, their 
support could be most helpful. George Creel, a national writer on the Mis-
souri political scene, has called the Judges' Association one of the most 
powerful political organizations in the state. Being aware of its power, 
Truman had sent to every county in the state a copy of the book entitled 
Jackson County — Results of County Planning. Throughout the book photo-
graphs clearly indicated the advancements made in Jackson County under 
Truman. Such publicity proved that Truman took maximum advantage of his 
successes throughout the whole state. 
In addition to his judgeship activities, Truman received favors from 
Governor Park which provided several opportunities to become better known 
in the state. Upon the Governor's request, Truman had gone to Washington 
to petition more federal relief for Missouri, had served as head of the Mis-
souri Re-employment Service and had spoken in thirty-five counties in the 
spring of 1934 for the statewide $10, 000, 000 bond issue for improving the 
penal and eleemosynary institutions. The Re-employment Service position 
proved most beneficial in that it required a trip to Jefferson City once or 
twice a week, thus providing him with an invaluable opportunity to increase 
his acquaintances in the state administration as well as to meet the vast 
number of people who would be served by such an agency during the depres-
sion. On the national level, he met Frances Perkins and Harry Hopkins, 
both of whom Truman grew to like very much. 
Certainly, the basis for Truman's "grass roots" support was quite 
pervasive. His membership in veterans' organizations, the Masons and the 
Baptist Church broadened his political appeal. Having been a farmer, he 
appeared to understand the hardships experienced at that time in rural Mis-
souri. Finally, he had been a small businessman who had failed, and this 
brought about unwittingly a bond with some small businessmen who were in 
danger of the same experience as a result of the depression. They admired 
in particular the determination with which Truman was paying back his 
debts. Finally, Truman put his wholehearted effort into the campaign and 
worked unceasingly in his traveUing and speaking, especially in the rural 
a r e a s . 8 
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Even with all these assets, Pendergast and Truman could not be sure 
of the victory. They had two strong opponents: Jacob (Tuck) Milligan and 
John Cochran. Milligan was backed by Senator Bennett Clark who was anx-
ious to repeat his victory over Pendergast from 1932. Milligan, a respected 
congressman, seemed to have the support of the national administration. 
Vice President John Garner had been urging Milligan for some time to run 
for the Senate. James Farley praised the Missourian's work in the House 
of Representatives and opined that Milligan would do justice to Missouri as 
a senator. Milligan also listed Harry B. Hawes, a former Missouri sena-
tor, among his stalwart supporters. Hawes had played a most influential 
role in placing Garner on the ticket with FDR in 1932, and Farley acclaimed 
Hawes as one of the keenest political analysts in the Democratic party; even 
more reason why Milligan expected Roosevelt's endorsement. 
John J. Cochran also entered the race from St. Louis. He had served 
in the House of Representatives since 1926. Previously he had been secre-
tary to Senator William Joel Stone during World War I when Stone had been 
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One Washington 
correspondent, Marquis Childs, has written glowingly of Cochran, believing 
that he was by far the best candidate in the 1934 senatorial race. A group 
of Washington news correspondents testified to Cochran's ability and lead-
ership by naming him as one of the five or six most useful members in Con-
gress. After Cochran announced his candidacy, William Hirth pledged the 
support of the Missouri Farmers ' Association to the St. Louisan. Most 
important of all, Cochran counted upon the backing of the Igoe-Dickmann 
machine in St. Louis which had the ability to amass the kind of support that 
Pendergast mobilized in Kansas City. 
Professor Dor sett has contended that Cochran was actually a stalking 
horse put in the race by Pendergast himself so as to take votes away from 
Milligan and allow Truman to win. The source of this contention is the 
opinion of a G. H. Forée, a St. Louisan who followed Missouri politics from 
the sidelines. Foree cites visits to Pendergast by Igoe and also Cochran in 
the spring of 1934. I have seen no other evidence for such visits. Even if 
they did take place, Foree is only conjecturing as to what transpired at the 
visits. Even if Cochran had gone to Kansas City, he could have asked Pen-
dergast's support for his own candidacy since Pendergast was having a dif-
ficult time finding an adequate choice. Asking for support and offering to 
run as a stalking horse are two quite different proposals. A number of peo-
ple who knew Cochran well have expressed strong opinions that Cochran 
never would have permitted himself to be a stalking horse for Pendergast. 
His character simply would not have permitted it. Moreover, Cochran 
really wanted to be senator in his own right and his credentials indicated 
that he would have been outstanding in that capacity. The senatorship would 
have been an excellent climax to a worthy career. And, for a stalking horse 
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he certainly waged an energetic rural campaign. In two months he t rav-
elled close to 6, 000 miles and made approximately 250 speeches.9 
Also, it is interesting to look at the election of 1934 in view of the 
Foree-Dorsett thesis. Truman won over Cochran by a margin of close to 
40, 000 votes (Truman received 276,850; Cochran 236,105; and Milligan, 
147,614). Truman carried 39 counties and Kansas City; Cochran 39 coun-
ties and St. Louis city; Milligan 36 counties. One of the strong Pendergast 
alliances was supposed to be the one with J. V. Conran in southeast Mis-
souri, but Truman won only three of the six counties in the bootheel. He 
even lost Conran!s New Madrid County to Cochran. Truman was able to win 
only six of the twenty counties comprising "Little Dixie, " and many felt it 
was the Pendergast affiliation that hurt Truman the most in this area. Tru-
man also lost Greene County and Springfield to Cochran. I am arguing here 
only that it was a close election and the " stalking horseM almost walked into 
the winner's circle. 
A final argument. Dorsett begins his chapter — "The Pendergast 
Machine and New Deal Politics" — with the following quote from Edwin 
O'Connors novel, The Last Hurrah: 
. . . the old time boss was destroyed because FDR took 
away his source of power. He made . . . [that] kind of 
p o l i t i c i a n . . . an anachronism . . . . All over the coun-
try the bosses have been dying for the last twenty years, 
thanks to Roosevelt. . . . If anybody wanted "anything — 
jobs, favors, cash - - h e could only go to the boss, the 
local leader. What Roosevelt did was to take the handouts 
out of the local hands. 
Dorsett then denies that this is true in Kansas City and with Pendergast. He 
argues that Pendergast had much too broad a base of power and served too 
many interests to be undercut by the New Deal. In fact, instead of the New 
Deal weakening Pendergast, it actually strengthened his position since so 
many of the New Deal programs were administered through Pendergast men 
such as Matthew Murray in the WPA.1 0 
I would grant that Pendergast had the inside track on the New Deal 
through such appointments as Matthew Murray, Foster W. Amick, A. R. 
Hendrix and even Joseph Amend in St. Louis. But, I would heartily agree 
with James FarleyT s comment that although in the short run Pendergast 
benefitted, in the long run the New Deal took away his power. H Before the 
New Deal, Pendergast was the source of his handouts to the poor, his jobs, 
his Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners and so forth. Pendergast himself 
determined what was given and to whom it was given and also by whom. If 
the intermediary official or politician did Pendergast' s bidding, then he kept 
his position. If the intermediary was unfaithful, then Pendergast dropped 
him. But when Washington became the source, Pendergast was relegated to 
to an intermediary role, and he had to come up to FDR1 s and the New Deal's 
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standards or be pushed aside. Pendergast was corrupt before the New Deal 
but no one could challenge him adequately. After the New Deal, Washington 
could and did challenge him. Others were vying with Pendergast to be 
intermediaries — Lloyd Start, Bennett Clark and St. Louis politicos Dick-
mann, Igoe and Hannegan. Farley was close to Pendergast but also to Sena-
tor Clark and Governor Stark and the St. Louis people. Consequently, I 
see this shift as an "essential" alteration in character, while Dorsett does 
not . 1 2 
One should note how quickly FDR abandoned Pendergast after the elec-
tion frauds of 1936. Truman tried to block the reappointment of Maurice 
Milligan as Federal District Attorney in Kansas City, but FDR insisted upon 
and won Milligan's appointment. Also, if the force of the New Deal had not 
begun to swing over to Stark, it is doubtful if Pendergast's James V. Bill-
ings would have lost to Stark's James M. Douglas in the crucial Missouri 
Supreme Court election of 1938. If Pendergast had remained the source, I 
doubt if Billings would have lost, and I doubt if Matthew Murray and A. R. 
Hendrix would have been sent to jail. 
I am simply arguing that Pendergast's power had grown before the 
New Deal through legitimate and illegitimate means. In fact, the corruption 
and malpractices enhanced his power. The New Deal took away Pender-
gast's freedom of action and relegated him to the role of intermediary bound 
to meet FDR's standards. A sufficient power now existed to defeat Pender-
gast. If Stark had not been able to call upon the federal government, he 
probably would have lost to Pendergast, 
One other point. Professor Dorsett argues persuasively that Pender-
gast played the role of broker to many interests in Kansas City — the under-
privileged, the middle class in the residential districts, the professional 
classes and the business community. Pendergast constantly searched for 
ways to serve and to find areas of strong agreement. Even in the insurance 
payoff, many others participated besides Pendergast and McElroy. The 
impression is given that the businessmen were willing cooperators. I would 
simply suggest that there was considerable intimidation. Many businessmen 
went along because they feared to have their tax assessments raised, their 
buildings condemned as fire traps or their lives threatened by mobsters. 
Voters were driven from the polls, and the police placidly watched while 
ballot boxes were being stuffed. 
I would only suggest that support was not always freely extended to 
Pendergast. The fact that the New Deal jobs could be taken from Pender-
gast meant that allegiances were not so firm after 1933. 
In conclusion, I would disagree on the following points. 
1. Pendergast had trouble finding a good candidate in 1934 because 
of the malicious and slanderous campaign which a Pendergast man 
would have to undergo. 
2. I deny that Cochran was a stalking horse for Pendergast in 1934. 
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3. I think the New Deal did undermine Pendergast in the long run. 
4. Also, I question how good a broker Pendergast was in Kansas City 
by calling for a more thorough investigation of his techniques of 
intimidation. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mitchell and 
Dorsett in revealing Pendergast's role in the 1932 Democratic Convention 
wherein FDR was nominated. I contended that Pendergast had opposed FDR 
rather strenuously, and subsequent relations were not too intimate. This is 
not so, as Mitchell has shown. But I am still left with a dilemma0 When 
Truman went to Washington in 1935, he definitely felt that he was being 
given a cold shoulder by FDR. He was very sensitive about being known as 
Pendergast's senator. Maybe overly sensitive. Maybe, too, the relations 
between FDR and Pendergast were cooler by 1935 because of the Kansas 
City record. 
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